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NOTES
PRIVATE RECOVERY UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
The Robinson-Patman Act presents in its own peculiar form the problems usually faced by the private plaintiff in antitrust litigation. The act,
having created a new test of competitive injury, presents difficulties concerning the private plaintiff's standing to sue. Moreover, the measurement
of damages resulting from the act's violation-a subject of infinite complexity in the antitrust area 'L-has been described in two inconsistent ways
by the courts. A minority equate the discriminatory differential imposed
upon the plaintiff with his damages; the majority believe that this differential, unless it is absorbed, has no relation to plaintiff's actual damages
and cannot be used as their measure. While this problem is not limited
to Robinson-Patman cases, it may require a different solution here, in view
of the distinct nature of the practices which the act is designed to eliminate.
I. ACTIONABLE INJURY

UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN

ACT

The Robinson-Patman Act was expressly designed to destroy the
2
power of large buyers to force price and service concessions from sellers,
whether or not their conduct is violative of other antitrust laws. To that
end, the act forbids the seller to discriminate in price between purchasers
of commodities of like grade and quality unless such discrimination is
justified by differences in cost,3 to pay brokerage commissions to the purchaser or to one controlled by the purchaser,4 to pay the purchaser for sales
services provided by him unless such payments are made proportionally
available to all other competing customers, 5 or to provide services to purchasers unless they are similarly made proportionally available. 6 The
buyer, in turn, is forbidden to pay brokerage to the seller or one controlled
by the seller 7 or to knowingly induce a discriminatory price.8
I See generally Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of Damages in Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEo. WAsH. L. REv.
231 (1961).
2 See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 49-50 (1948) ; EDwARDs, THE PRucE
DiscRuinAioN LAW 21, 29 (1959); Rowe, The Evolution of the Robinson-Patman
Act: A Twenty-Year Perspective, 57 COLUm. L. REv. 1059, 1061 (1957).
349 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958).
449 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1958).
5 49 Stat 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1958).
649 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1958).
749 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1958).
8 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1958).
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A. Competitive Injury Under the Act
While the effect upon competition is of no relevance in a section 2(c),
2(d), or 2(e) proceeding, 9 the granting of a discriminatory price in sales
of commodities of like grade and quality must, in order to come within
the sanctions of section 2(a) of the act, have the requisite competitive
effect.' 0
In the Second Circuit, there is a presumption of such effect once it is
established that the defendant has granted a discriminatory price." While
other circuits require the plaintiff to establish injury to competition,' 2 the
Robinson-Patman Act's unique test of such injury seems to make this
requirement meaningless. For, in addition to two standards of competitive
injury taken over from the Clayton Act-the substantial lessening of competition and the tendency to create a monopoly 13-the Robinson-Patman
Act establishes a third-the injury, destruction, or prevention of "competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of
such discrimination, or with customers of either of them."14 Although it
has been questioned whether this is a proper test of competitive injury,'5
the statutory language would seem clearly to permit the investigation of
competitive effect to be focussed not merely on a relatively broad market
area, but on the individual victim of the discrimination.' 6 If this test is
accepted, then proof by a victim of a price discrimination that he has been
damaged thereby is sufficient to meet the burden of proving the required
competitive effect.
The difference in basic purpose between the Robinson-Patman Act on
the one hand and the Clayton and Sherman Acts on the other serves to
explain why only the Robinson-Patman "7 permits proof of damages to ful9

See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 58-59 (1959); Oliver Bros.

v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763, 767 (4th Cir. 1939); EnwARDs, THE
LAW 164 (1959).

PRICE DiscrmATrIox

1049 Stat 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958).
11 Samuel F. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
734 (1945); Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345, 353
(E.D.N.Y. 1960) ; Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457, 460 (2d Cir.)
(dictum), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957).

12 Elgin Corp. v. Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co., 251 F.2d 7, 11 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
357 U.S. 926 (1958); Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356,

367-68 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956).
Is Compare 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958), with
§7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
1449 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958).
15ATTy GEN. NAVT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 164-65 (1955). See also Purex
Corp., 51 F.T.C. 100, 112 (1954). It is possible to read portions of the legislative
history as supporting the Attorney General's Committee's suggestion that the RobinsonPatman language should be limited in its application to cases in which predatory
price cutting has damaged one competitor and threatems injury to the general public.
See S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936).
16 e Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345, 352 (E.D.
N.Y. 1960); EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRnNATIoN LAw 519-20 (1959). Moreover,
the legislative history is by no means in conflict with the plain meaning of the act.
Not only must those portions of the history discussed in note 15 supra be read
narrowly to achieve their restrictive meaning, but other portions clearly support the
broader reading. See 80 CONG. REc. 3113 (1936) (remarks of Senator Logan).
17 See Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670, 675 (S.D. Cal. 1951) ; Weinberg
v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 48 F. Supp. 203, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1942); Midland Oil Co. v.
Sinclair Ref. Co., 41 F. Supp. 436 (N.D. 11. 1941).
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fill the burden of proving competitive injury. s For, whereas the Clayton
and Sherman Acts are concerned mainly with restraints which result in
broad public injury, the Robinson-Patman Act is particularly concerned
with injury to competitors as an incipient threat of injury to the public
at large.1 9 Since Robinson-Patman violations are thus not likely to have
resulted in public injury, it would be hardly logical to require such proof
as a condition precedent to private recovery.
B. Levels of Competition and Standing to Sue
Under section 4 of the Clayton Act 2° -the source of all private
recovery under the antitrust laws-standing to sue is based upon plaintiff's
proof that he has been injured in his business or property.2 1 Generally
speaking, the only limitation upon such recovery is that the injury must
be "direct." 22 However, the Robinson-Patman Act poses a problem of
standing in which an apparently direct injury may not be sufficient to
permit recovery because the relationship between plaintiff and defendant
does not come within its substantive provisions. The words of section
2(a), "to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or
with customers of either of them," 23 establish three possible levels of competitive injury: primary--competition between the discriminating seller
and his competitors, secondary-competition between the recipient of the
18 'Normally, a plaintiff under the Sherman or Clayton Act must prove injury
to the public in order to prove the substantive violation on which his recovery depends.
See, e.g., Shotkin v. General Elec. Co., 171 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1948). No such proof
is needed in the area of per se violations. See, e.g., Kior's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). A recent decision suggests that proof of injury
to the public is no longer needed, even under the traditional antitrust laws. K.S. Corp.
v. Chemstrand Corp., 198 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The court based its abandonment of the well-established rule on language in the recent Supreme Court decision
in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660 (1961),
which suggested that the rule of reason would no longer be applicable to private
recoveries under the Sherman Act. This would result in the anomalous situation
in which the Government could not interdict a restraint because it was reasonable but
the victims could sue for damages under the strict language of the statute. Since
the facts of the case show a refusal to deal, a more reasonable reading of the decision
would be that the Court was merely emphasizing that this was a per se violation,
despite a lower court finding to the contrary, and that no public injury need be established. This is the assumption of one commentator. See 1961 DUxE L.J. 302, 303.
But see Mueller, Antitrust Conspiracies-Doctrineof Public Injury, 8 FFa. B. Nmvs
145 (1961).
19 "Only through such injuries, in fact, can the larger general injury result, and
to catch the weed in the seed will keep it from coming to flower." S. REP. No. 1502,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936).
20 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
2
1 "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may . . . recover threefold the damages
by him sustained .

.

. ."

Ibid.

See generally Comment, 46 CALIF. L. REv. 447 (1958). An example of a
direct injury is the illegally increased price paid to a violator of the antitrust laws.
See id. at 448. Examples of indirect losses include loss in value of stock of the
affected company, see Martens v. Barrett, 245 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1957), and loss of
patronage suffered by a supplier of the business directly affected, see Snow Crest
Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956).
2349 Stat 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958).
22
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discriminatory price and his competitors, and tertiary-competition among
the customers of those who do or do not receive the discriminatory price.
In view of the major purpose of the act-to restrict the power of large
buyers on the secondary level 24-it might be argued that its sanctions
should be restricted to that level. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court answered this argument as to the primary level by holding, in Moore v.
Mead's Fine Bread Co.,2 5 that a private plaintiff had a right to recover for
the destruction of his business in a local price war won by his competitor
through the use of profits made in interstate commerce where the competitor maintained prices at their normal level. Despite this decision a
conflict in the circuits arose 26 which was settled by the Court's unanimous
reiteration of Moore in FTC v. Anheuser Busch, IncY7 There the Court
held that section 2 (a) of the act made it unlawful for a national seller of
beer to discriminate in price between noncompeting purchasers in different
areas of the country with the result that defendant's competitors in one
area were injured by the diversion in trade.
The problem of who-if anyone-may recover at the tertiary level
still poses difficult problems. Since section 2(d) of the act refers only to
"customers of" and 2(e) only to "purchasers" from the discriminatory
seller,28 the answer depends on the definition of those terms. 2 9 While
section 2(a) also refers to purchasers, it covers, in addition, a situation in
which purchasers from purchasers may be injured; hence, arguably, these
parties on the tertiary level should be permitted to recover for section 2 (a)
discriminations which affect them. Recovery, however, no matter under
which section of the act, must be based on findings that the original seller
either sold directly to the complaining purchaser, controlled the price paid
by the buyer on the tertiary level,30 or established the terms of the discriminatory sale.31
Klein v. Lionel Corp3 2 illustrates this limiting approach. There defendant sold toy trains to wholesalers and large retailers at the same price.
Plaintiff, a competitor of a large retailer, brought suit under section 2(a),
alleging a price discrimination resulting from the fact that he was forced
to pay more than the large retailer for the same merchandise. The court
held that plaintiff could not recover since he was not a purchaser from
Lionel, but a purchaser from a wholesaler. The court stated that the
words of section 2(a) "'or with customers of either of them' . . . merely
See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 49-50 (1948).
U.S. 115 (1954).
26 Compare Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F2d 356 (9th Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956), with Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond
Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960).
27363 U.S. 536 (1960).
2849 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(d), 13(e) (1958).
29 See note 40 infra.
24

25 348

3
0Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1957);
cf. Dentists' Supply Co., 37 F.T.C. 345 (1943) ; Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C.

537 (1937) (dictum).
31 FTC v. Grand Union Co., 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962) ; K.S. Corp. v. Chemstrand Corp., 198 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
32 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956).
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indicate the level on which the discrimination practiced on a purchaser
might be felt in order for it to be actionable." 38 This broad statement may
well have been unnecessary since the court intimated that the prices to both
wholesaler and retailer were justified. 34 In that event, while the costs to
large and small retailer were different, and in a sense discriminatory, the
discrimination was an inevitable result of the marketing process since the
wholesaler would of necessity have to charge more for the product than the
price at which it was sold to him (and to the large retailer) 3.
The requirement of the initial seller's control over his wholesaler's
pricing policy in order to hold the seller a violator 86 is based on the admittedly important policy consideration-seldom articulated-that otherwise to hold the seller responsible for his wholesaler's pricing would be to
force him, in direct violation of the Sherman Act, to fix his wholesaler's
prices in self-defense.37 However, to effectuate this policy by a debatable
interpretation of section 2(a) denies redress to the ultimate purchaser
where it is the initial seller, as in Klein, who discriminates and where his
wholesaler is merely a conduit to the ultimate purchaser. Such a possibility exists, for example, where the seller discriminates in price between
two wholesalers who reflect this differential in their resale prices.38 Here,
even if the effects of the discrimination fall solely on the ultimate purchaser, the rationale of Klein would deny this purchaser redress against
the initial seller, for the discrimination is felt at what Klein terms the
"descriptive" level.
Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.3 9 represents a possible retreat from this rationale. There it was held that a wholesaler who was
3
Id. at 15. See also Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp.
345, 352 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) : "[]nder the new law it became a violation if the requisite

anti-competitive effect were felt at the level where buyers from buyers of the discriminating seller compete." This seems to interpret §2(a) merely as describing a
certain competitive situation which would allow those on the secondary level to seek
relief, rather than affording redress to those at the tertiary level. This approach
reconciles §2(a) with §§2(d) and 2(e) in that each section would then require
privity or what may be termed constructive privity.
34
Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13, 14 (3d Cir. 1956). Moreover, since the
price to the wholesaler and large retailer was the same, it would seem that no violation
of the act occurred. See Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., supra note 33;
Brooks, Injury to Competition Under the Robinson-PatinanAct, 109 U. P&. L. REv.
777, 804 (1961).
35 The lower court pointed out that in order to give the small and large retailer
the same competitive advantage, the seller would be required to give the wholesaler
a non-cost-justified price cut-in itself violative of the act. Klein v. Lionel Corp.,
138 F. Supp. 560, 565 (D. Del.), aff'd, 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956).
36 See cases cited in note 30 supra.
37ATfy GEN. NAT'L COmm. ANTITRUST REP. 206-07 (1955).
88 In such a situation, the purchaser from the wholesaler is a customer of the
one (the wholesaler) who knowingly received the concession, as required by § 2(a).
To hold the words "or with customers of either of them" merely descriptive of a
competitive situation is to admit that one on the tertiary level has been injured, but
to deny him any redress. Compare Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp.
541 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), in which Philco sold to an independent wholesaler who discriminated and the privity requirement was quite properly applied, thus preventing
recovery against Philco.
39 142 F. Supp. 230 (D.N.J. 1956).

1962] PRIVATE RECOVERY UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 703

required to pay more for a product than a large retailer could obtain relief
under section 2(a). While both wholesaler and retailer were direct purchasers, they were not in competition, since they operated at different
functional levels. The court's finding of injury to competition was based
on the fact that the wholesaler's customers were unable to meet the competition of the direct purchaser. Implicit in the holding is the assumption that
either the wholesaler's customers would desert him in order to obtain a
better price, or their customers would desert them for the same reasoneventually resulting in a loss of business to the wholesaler. If, however,
he was able to retain his customers and pass on the increase to them (for
example, if because no other wholesaler was able to provide such commodities at a lesser price and the retailers were forced to absorb the
increase), there may possibly be no private recovery. On the one hand,
the wholesaler has suffered no provable damages, on the other, the retailers,
since they are not direct purchasers from the discriminator, cannot make
out a substantive violation. It is hard to justify any interpretation of section 2(a) which would make the possibility of private recovery so completely dependent on who was the final victim of the discrimination.40
In some situations the wholesaler may be in competition with his supplier for the business of the same customer. When the seller sells at the
same discriminatory price to both a wholesaler and a potential customer of
the wholesaler, it is uniformly held that no actionable discrimination has
occurred, for, even if the seller had charged a nondiscriminatory price to
wholesaler and customer, the wholesaler could not have competed since he
41
would of necessity have had to charge a higher price than did the seller.
This situation bears a close resemblance to that existing in Klein, where the
manufacturer sold at the same price to both wholesaler and large retailer.
By contrast, in Krug the wholesaler was not complaining of inability to
compete with his seller, but that, as a result of the discrimination, his purchasers could not compete with the large retailer and that he, in turn, was
being injured by the loss of their trade. Insofar as large and small retailers
are in competition with each other, any discriminatory concession granted
to the large retailer-who alone purchases direct-is felt by the small retailer with resultant injury either to him, to the wholesaler, or to both. In
this event, the requirement that any price differential between wholesaler
and large retailer be cost justified would benefit the small retailer (or the
wholesaler) in that he would then be disadvantaged in a lesser amount.
40

This is not to deny that Klein can be justified by a strict reading of § 2(a) ;
merely pointing to the use of "purchaser," without considering any underlying policies

which might call for a broader construction. However, since the courts have already
expanded that term to include those who purchase from a middleman whose prices
are dictated by the seller, it could not logically be limited to exclude those who bear
the brunt of a price increase where this is the inevitable result of the seller's initial
discrimination.
41

See Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.Y.
1960); Secatore's Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 171 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1959) ;
A. J. Goodman & Son, Inc. v. United Lacquer Mfg. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890 (D. Mass.

1949).
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In such a situation it should not matter that a wholesaler intervenes between
the seller and the retailer, for no matter what the wholesaler does-whether
he absorbs the price increase or passes it on to his purchaser--one or both
is injured by a discrimination practiced by the seller.
II.

MEASURING DAMAGES UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT

To recover what amounts to punitive damages 4 under section 4 of
the Clayton Act 43 the private plaintiff must first establish a basic com-

pensable injury. This entails proof of a substantive violation and that
this violation has caused plaintiff a proximate loss 4 through increased
costs,45 depreciation of assets,4 6 or loss of profits.47

This double burden

is somewhat eased by section 5 which permits judgment in favor of the
Government to be used a prima facie evidence of violation in a subsequent

private antitrust action. 48 Furthermore, the Supreme Court-probably in
49
recognition of the private suit's dual function of redress and enforcement
-has been sympathetic towards the difficulty of proving pecuniary loss.
v. Ford Motor Co., 186 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Ohio
"The essential nature . . . of a treble damage action under the Clayton Act,

42 See Englander Motors, Inc.

1960).

as we construe the numerous decisions on the subject, is one which grants . . .
actual damages as a compensatory or remedial recovery, and then imposes a penalty
by tripling the actual damage as a deterrent against violators of the antitrust laws
. " Id. at 85. Accord, Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955) ; Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under
the Anti-Trust Act Penal or Compensatory?, 28 Ky. LJ. 117, 128, 157 (1939).
4338 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §14 (1958).
44
Miller Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441, 448 (4th Cir. 1958);
Shotkin v. General Elec. Co., 171 F2d 236, 238-39 (10th Cir. 1948); Nelligan v.
Ford Motor Co., 161 F. Supp. 738, 741 (W.D.S.C. 1958), af'd, 262 F.2d 556 (4th
Cir. 1959); Brenner v. Texas Co., 140 F. Supp. 240, 243 (N.D. Cal. 1956); Sunbeam Corp. v. Payless Drug Stores, 113 F. Supp. 31, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1953); A. J.
Goodman & Son, Inc. v. United Lacquer Mfg. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D. Mass.
1949) ; Donovan & Irvine, Proof of Daimages Under the Anti-Trust Law, 88 U. PA.
L. Rav. 511, 515 (1940).
45 SeThomsen v. Cayser, 234 U.S. 66 (1917) ; Pfotzer v. Aqua. Sys., Inc., 162

F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Peto v. Howell, 101 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1938).
46 See Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555
(1931); Bruce's juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949),
aff'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. disnissed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951).
47
See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946); Milwaukee
Towne Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
909 (1952). Proof of loss is of such importance that in protracted antitrust suits,
courts have at times reversed the usual order of proof and required the plaintiff to first
show that he has suffered a compensable loss. See Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225
F.2d 427, 429 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 915 (1955) ; Riss & Co. v. Association
of Am. R.Rh, 190 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1960).
4838 Stat 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1958). The unique nature
of the Robinson-Patian Act suggests that proof of individual damages resulting from
a discrimination would in itself be proof of a violation, see note 18 supra, so that a
prior Government victory is not the only shortcut in this area.
49 See Jewel Tea Co. v. Local Unions, 274 F.2d 217, 223 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 936 (1960); Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 186 F. Supp. 82,
85 (N.D. Ohio 1960); United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137
F. Supp. 167, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) ; Comment, 70 YALE LJ. 469, 477 (1961).
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While wholly speculative damages will not be awarded, 50 it seems that a
jury award will not be overturned where plaintiff has established that he
has been injured but cannot prove the precise amount of loss.51 Of course,
plaintiff must enable the jury to make an educated guess by, for example,

comparing his profits with those of a competitor, or by comparing his own
profits before and after the initiation of the alleged misconduct. 52 However,
the fact that these comparisons can only indicate the magnitude of actual
loss does not preclude its use where the difficulty of exact proof may be
ascribed to defendant's unlawful conduct 3 3 This is the essence of what is
commonly called the "wrongdoer" rule, a rule whose origin may be traced
4
to the Supreme Court's decision in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures."
55
While the rule has contributed to the general rise in treble damage suits,
its application is dependent on the presence of the appropriate factual context which allows for considerable freedom of judicial interpretation.5 6
Despite the Court's sympathy, only five cases in the twenty-six year
history of the Robinson-Patman Act have awarded damages using the
50 Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 181 F.2d 70, 83-84 (7th Cir.
1950), -reVd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 558 (1951) ; Delaware Valley Marine Supply
Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 184 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Pa. 1960) ; Clapper v. Original

Tractor Cab Co., 165 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. Ind. 1958), affd it; part, rev'd in part, 270
F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 967 (1960); Mason City Tent &
Awning Co. v. Clapper, 144 F. Supp. 754 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
51 See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555,
562 (1931):
It is true that there was uncertainty as to the extent of the damage but . . .
there is a clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to establish
the fact that petitioner had sustained some damage, and the measure of proof
necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount
Clark The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in Private Antitrust Suits, 52 Mrcr. L. REv. 363, 383 (1954).
52 See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
53
In Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, supra note 52, plaintiff attempted to
establish loss by comparing his theater's profits with those of a competitor and by a
comparison of its profits under a former owner with profits during his ownership.
Defendant argued that plaintiff could not prove his actual loss, since the conspiracy
affected both plaintiff's competitor and the former owner. While the Court warned
that damages based on guesswork would not be permitted, it pointed out that defendanes own conduct had made proof difficult, and upheld the award, stating that
the jury "may make a just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant
data, and render its verdict accordingly." Id. at 264. This case has been construed
as permitting damages where "there is no possibility of proving what the plaintiff's
receipts would be i a market not controlled by the combination." Clark, supra note 51,
at 379. See also Greenwald, Measurement of Damages in Private Antitrust Suits,
5 AxTunusr BuIL. 293 (1960).
54 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
The Bigelow rule was so characterized in Bruce's Juices,
Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985, 992 (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 919
(Sth Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 347 U.S. 875 (1951).
55 See Greenwald, supra note 53, at 298; Comment, 61 YArI L.J. 1010 (1952).
56 See Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of Danages in
Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEo. WAsix. L. REv. 231,
254-55 (1961). Compare Riss & Co. v. Association of Am. R.R., 190 F. Supp. 10
(D.D.C. 1960), with American Co-op. Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 721 (1946). In Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F.2d
427, 431-32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 915 (1955), the court specifically refused
to extend the Bigelow rule from what it characterized as the predictable business of
theater operation to the highly speculative manufacturing industries.
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generally accepted rules of proof of damages. 57 These rules-requiring
at least a reasonable attempt at establishing actual loss-may be necessary
where the private suitor attempts to establish loss of future profits, loss of
good will, or loss represented by depreciation in property value. However,
where the unlawful behavior has resulted in a discrimination in price between two competitors, or a general increase in the price of the product
sold, the possibility of a second approach to the question of damages exists.
Admittedly, the great weight of authority is to the effect that proof of
a discrimination in price 58 or of an increase in price 5 9 alone is not sufficient to establish the amount of damage. Rather, plaintiff must establish
some special damage flowing from such conduct.

6°

Where plaintiff has

absorbed the price increase it may be possible under this theory to equate
his legal injury with the amount of the increase. Thus, only where plaintiff is an ultimate consumer 61 or maintains his resale price at the old level
despite the increase, 62 may he recover that increase; for here his damages
have, in a sense, been liquidated. However, another technique whereby
plaintiff's recovery is aided is found in the opinions of a respectable minority of courts which equate the price discrimination or increase with the
damage sustained by the plaintiff. 63 In a recent case based on a violation
57 Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954); Atlas Bldg. Prods.
Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
363 U.S. 843 (1960); American Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., supra note 56;
Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd,
187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. disndssed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951) (where the
special damages were in addition to general damages). In two cases damages were
recovered under what this Note terms the "general damage rule." Elizabeth Arden
Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773
(1945); Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., supra. There is some dispute as
to the rule under which recovery was had in American Co-op. Serum Ass'n v. Anchor
Serum Co., supra. See note 141 infra. There were 111 reported cases brought by
private parties between 1936 and August 1961. The percentage of success in the
Robinson-Patman area is considerably less than that in other areas of the antitrust
laws. Barber, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-Patinan
Experience, 30 Go. WASH. L. Rxv. 181, 191-93 (1961).
58 See Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 965 (1957) ; Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345,
(E.D.N.Y. 1960).
353 59
Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 734 (1945); Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 42 F. Supp. 369 (W.D.
Wis.), appeal dismissed, 130 F2d 535 (7th Cir. 1942); Banana Distribs., Inc. v.
United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp. 32, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (dictum), rev'd on other
grounds, 269 F2d 790 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Beacon Fruit & Produce Co. v. H. Harris &
Co., Inc., 160 F. Supp. 95, 102 (D. Mass.) (dictum), affd, 260 F2d 958 (1st Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959).
60 It is possible that the Bigelow rule may be used to ease the plaintiff's burden
here. See note 53 supra. Clark, supra note 51, questions the applicability of the rule
to the Robinson-Patman area. There may also be problems in application where the
goods involved in a discrimination are likely to be only one of hundreds of items in
plaintiff's inventory. See, e.g., FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 63-64
(1959) ; FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 48-50 (1948).
OI Cf. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390
(1906).
62
Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 297 Fed. 791 (2d Cir. 1924).
6 See Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); Peto v. Howell, 101 F.2d 353
(7th Cir. 1938); United States Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 163 Fed. 701
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908). The authority of these cases is weakened by the fact that the
possibility of passing-on was not adverted to.
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of the Sherman Act, it was held that a shoe manufacturer could recover, as
damages, excessive rentals paid on shoe machinery.64 The manufacturer
did not introduce evidence that he maintained his resale prices at the old
level.6 5 Yet the court permitted recovery, stating: "The plaintiff's injury
occurred when it was charged too much for the machinery . .. Things
which happen later and let an injured plaintiff escape some of the ultimate
consequences of the wrong done him do not inure to the benefit of the
defendant." 66 It is apparent that this rationale does more than shift the
burden of proving absorption from the plaintiff to the defendant. Rather,
it establishes a conclusive presumption that injury accrues at the instant
the increased price is paid. Defendant may not rebut this presumption by
establishing that plaintiff increased his resale price, and thereby "passed
on" some or all of the increase to others. Henceforth, this rule will be
termed the general damage rule, as opposed to the special damage rule.
In its application to Robinson-Patman cases it is assumed that the rule will
come into play once there is established a discrimination with the requisite
competitive impact, which cannot be justified by any of the available defenses--cost, meeting competition, or changing market conditions.
A. The General Damage Rule and the Robinson-Patman Act
The original Robinson-Patman bill contained a proposal which would
have replaced the usual rule of proof of damages with one especially designed to deal with discriminatory price and service concessions. It provided that: "For purposes of suit under section 4 of this Act, the measure of damages for any violation of this section shall, . . . in the absence
of proof of greater damage, be presumed to be the pecuniary amount or
equivalent of the prohibited discrimination, payment, or grant involved in
such violation . ..."67
This provision, which apparently would have established an irrebuttable presumption that the damage was at least equivalent to the discrimina68
tion was eliminated in conference without explanation.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court suggested the propriety of just such
a measure of damages in Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co.69
There defendant was being sued for his default on several promissory notes
while the same parties, their positions reversed, were involved in another
suit wherein American Can was charged with discriminating in price be64 Hanover

Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 826 (M.D. Pa.),

aff'd per curiam, 281 F2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 901 (1960).
6
5A possible alternative ground is suggested in the opinion, but the proper basis

for the case seems dearly to be that articulated in text

notes 99-100 infra.

66185 F. Supp. at 829.

6T S.REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1936).
68 See H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1936).
69 330 U.S. 743 (1947).

See text accompanying
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tween the juice company and other purchasers. Defendant argued that it
should be permitted to avoid the contract with American Can on the
grounds that it was illegal. One of its points was that since it could not
hope to succeed in the damage suit because of the difficulty of proof of
damages, it should be granted the relief of cancellation of its contract of
purchase. 70 In refusing this relief on the grounds that Congress had not
provided for such a sanction, the Court referred to defendant's argument
as to the difficulty of proof in the pending damage suit and discounted it
stating:
For despite petitioner's plaint on the difficulty of proving damages, it would establish its right to recover three times the discriminatory difference without proving more than the illegality of
the prices. If the prices are illegally discriminatory, petitioner has
been damaged, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, at
least in the amount of that discrimination. 7 '
This measure of damages had been applied by the Eighth Circuit in
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co. 72 There defendant was
charged with violations of sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman
Act. It had placed its cosmetics in plaintiff's store under an agreement
whereby it promised to pay one-half of the salary of a demonstrator provided by the plaintiff and had a similar agreement with a competitor of
plaintiff which provided for the full salary of the demonstrator. The lower
court had awarded damages of $3,030-the difference between the salaries
provided for the plaintiff's and its competitor's demonstrators, trebled.
On appeal, the defendant urged that the amount of the discrimination
could not be the measure of damages and that plaintiff should be required
to establish some special injury to its business. While the court recognized
that there might be circumstances in which this measure of damages would
be improper, it affirmed the lower court's use of the general damage rule
in the case before it. 73 The problem of the exact meaning of the rule in
this area remains. As noted above, the Hanover Shoe decision, in applying
the general damage rule, implicitly disclaimed any intention of examining
neither
plaintiff's conduct after payment of the increase 74-apparently
party is required or allowed to prove or disprove absorption. The court
in Gus Blass did not advert to this problem so that it is impossible to state
definitely whether the rule, as applied in that case, is one which establishes
a conclusive presumption of damage or merely shifts the burden of proving
7Old. at 756.

71 Id. at 757 (dictum). See Becker-Lelmann, Inc. v. Firestone Tire & RubberCo.,
202 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Mo. 1959) (on defendant's motion for summary judgment).
72 150 F2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945).
73Id. at 995-96.
74 See text accompanying notes 65-66 supra.
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passing-on to the defendant.75 Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the
passing-on doctrine was well established at the time this case was decided,
the court's disregard of it seems highly significant. 76
A different result from that of Gus Blass was reached by the Second
7
Circuit in Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. 7
The facts were similar to those in Gus Blass except that defendant, while
supplying other retailers with demonstrators whose salaries it paid in whole
or in part, did not provide plaintiff with even partial payment for demonstrators-and plaintiff employed none. While the court in Sun Cosmetic
refused to follow the rule in Gus Blass, this refusal may be based on a
distinction between the facts of the cases: in Sun Cosmetic the plaintiff
never hired a demonstrator and hence lost not the cost of the demonstrator
but the value of the additional sales which a demonstrator could produce.78
Thus Gus Blass may be described as-in effect-a section 2 (a) case. For,
since both plaintiff and its competitor were provided with the same service,

there was no discrimination in service. Rather, the discrimination resulted
in an increased cost of the product-goods plus demonstrator-which is
the basis of a section 2(a) violation.79
However, the Second Circuit clearly declined to follow Gus Blass in
Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co.s0 There defendant had leased a
75 The proposed statutory measure of damages would have established a presumption of minimum damages equivalent to the discrimination. See text accompanying note 67 wpra. Compare Barber, mupra note 57, at 224: "However, any fear
of injustice that use of this suggested technique might generate could be largely
alleviated by allowing a defendant to offer rebuttal evidence tending to show that
the actual injury is less than that indicated by the formula . . . . The burden here
would rest clearly on the defendant to offer convincing evidence in support of its
contention." See text accompanying notes 125-30 infra.
76 The court may, of course, have inclined to view Gus Blass as the ultimate
consumer of the services, or have believed that passing-on was impossible under the
circumstances of the case. Yet, if passing-on was to have any place in its application
of the general damage rule, it seems likely that the court would have discussed the
problem. The later dictum in Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S.
743, 757 (1947), suggests that the presumption against passing is irrebutable.
77 178 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1949).
7 8 See Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 996 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945):
Discriminations obviously are possible, from whose nature there can be
no direct or general damages but only consequential or special damages.
For example, a discriminatory allowance of funds to a customer, to be used
by him solely in advertising or promoting business in the seller's goods,
would perhaps not furnish a basis for general damages, since the injury to
a competitor probably would depend upon the results which the advertising
funds produced, and hence the damages from the difference in treatment
would not be direct but consequential.
79 Compare Atlantic City Wholesale Drug Co., 38 F.T.C. 631, 635-36 (1944);
Miami Wholesale Drug Corp., 28 F.T.C. 485, 490 (1939). In both cases respondents
were charged with inducing a discriminatory price differential. Since their suppliers
had paid for advertising in respondent's magazine, it was arguable that this was a
practice which violated only § 2(d). The Commission held that since the suppliers
permitted respondents to deduct the advertising charge from the cost of goods supplied, and that since the magazine was a worthless advertising medium, the effect
of the practice was to induce a discrimination in price.
80240 Fd 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957).
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service station to the plaintiff. In order to protect its dealers from the
effects of two price wars, defendant offered rebates on its gasoline to enable
them to compete and still maintain their profit margins. During the first
war defendant gave plaintiff a smaller rebate than that given to its competitors. During the second, plaintiff received no rebate. The lower court
found the damages in both situations to be the difference between the
prices charged plaintiff and the lowest price charged to its competitors.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that only where it was clear that
plaintiff absorbed rather than passed on the increase to his customers would
the difference in price be equivalent to the damages sustained. 81 In the
absence of proof of absorption, damages would have to be established by
showing loss of profits consequentially resulting from such discriminatory
price.
One other case, the remanded Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can
Co., 82 applied the test announced in Gus Blass. There, however, the court,
while concluding that damage was equivalent to the discriminatory difference in the price of tin cans sold to plaintiff and his competitors, 83 also
permitted special, or consequential, damages measured by the loss of profits
caused by a discriminatory allowance granted by defendant to one of
plaintiff's competitors. The court applied, in reference to the special
damages, what it termed the "wrongdoer" rule of Bigelow, stating that the
"'absence of more precise proof' is a risk which properly here falls upon
the defendant." 8
1. "Extraordinary" Circumstances
The Supreme Court in Bruce's Juices85 announced that in certain
"extraordinary" circumstances, the mere fact that a discriminatory allowance had been granted would not permit plaintiff to recover the amount of
the discrimination as his damages. Although the Court did not define
those circumstances, the Eighth Circuit, which had independently taken
the position announced in Bruce's Juices, was faced, in American Can Co.
81
See American Co-op. Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.Zd 907 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 721 (1946), a primary-line case in which plaintiff responded to a price cut by a similar cut in the price of his product The court
permitted recovery of the amount of the price cut
8287 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), petition for
cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951).
83 Id. at 990.
84 Id. at 993. In addition to giving general damages resulting from the discrimination in price and consequential damages resulting from the runway allowance, the
court recognized that plaintiff suffered damages from the combination of these two
activities which affected plaintiff's progress in the citrus industry, and caused a drop
in sales and loss of "good will." Id. at 992-93. Because of the insufficiency of plaintiff's evidence, however, no monetary amount was attributed to each of these losses.
Rather, the court stated, apparently in an effort at explanation: "I am of the opinion
that it will best serve the ends of justice for me to determine the minimum amount
of plaintiff's total damage, from which all inter-relation, duplication or overlap has
been eliminated rather than to endeavor to segregate the various items." Id. at 993.
S Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947).
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v. Russellville Canning Co.,86 with what it appears to have considered to
be such circumstances. There defendant can company manufactured its
product in Indiana but, during the period in question, equalized the freight
on its cans to Fort Smith, Arkansas. Plaintiff canning company, located
in Russellville, Arkansas, which without the equalization would have paid
the same freight charges on its purchases as did its competitors in Fort
Smith, was thus required to pay an additional 363 per cwt. The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that defendant's method of freight
equalization resulted in an unlawful discrimination under section 2(a).
The opinion noted, however, that plaintiff was actually benefited by
defendant's overall plan since under its contract with defendant it could
have been required to pay freight equalized to St. Louis. Conceding that
ordinarily the discrimination in price granted to competing purchasers
would also be deemed to be plaintiff's damages, the court held that in this
case plaintiff could not possibly have been damaged for, in addition to paying less freight than if the plan were not in effect, plaintiff's competitive
position, impaired as to its Fort Smith competitors, was enhanced as to
87
its competitors located outside of the Ozark area.
In this situation, plaintiff paid more money for the same product than
did certain of its competitors, and in this respect his position was the same
as that of the plaintiff in Gus Blass. Had Gus Blass still been generally
acceptable to the Eighth Circuit, it does not seem that plaintiffs situation
should have been considered to be such an "extraordinary" circumstance
as to deny to him the benefit of the general damage rule. 88 The basis of
that rule is that if plaintiff is unlawfully required to pay more than his
competitor, the plaintiff's damage is computed with regard to the discrimination and without regard to actual loss. Yet the Russellville court
considered essentially extraneous factors-the benefits received from the
scheme by plaintiff vis-a.-vis his other competitors-in concluding that
plaintiff had suffered no loss.P
In fact, it is questionable whether this decision is supportable even
under the special damage rule. The Robinson-Patman Act is uniquely
concerned with discriminations which tend to impair competition with any
person. 0 Under this test, the issue would seem to be not whether plaintiff's position with regard to other competitors, not parties to the suit, was
enhanced by seller's discriminatory system, but rather, whether his position
vis-A-vis those who were benefited by the discriminatory price had been
impaired. Clearly, in Russellville, although both plaintiff and his Fort
Smith competitors benefited by the scheme, the plaintiff's benefit was re86191 F2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951).
87 Id. at 55.
88
There are those who think that this decision overruled Gus Blass. See note

95 infra.
8
9American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 55 (8th Cir. 1951).
90 See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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duced by the amount of the discrimination between it and its Fort Smith
competitors.
2. Service Discrimination
While sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act deal with
discriminations in service which, at least formally, are distinguishable from
discriminations in price, it is evident that, under certain circumstances,
the effect of a discrimination in service is precisely that of a discrimination
in price. Thus, in the Gus Blass case, while the discrimination was formally characterized as one involving services, the effect was the same as if
plaintiff had been charged more than its competitor for a package deal of
goods plus demonstrator. However, where true service discrimination
is practiced, the effect in terms of damage to plaintiff's business is arguably of a different order. Thus, if defendant provides a demonstrator to
one purchaser and not the other,91 or purchases advertising from one buyer
and not the other 9 2 -even if the worth of such services can be reduced to
a monetary amount 983-the purchaser who has not received such service or
payments has not suffered a direct business damage by paying more than
his competitor. In such a situation, it might be argued that plaintiff has
not suffered general damages. However, it seems anomalous that one
who only has to pay a fraction of his demonstrator's salary, as in Gus
Blass, should have an advantage, in the quest for redress, over one who
receives no demonstrator at all.9
B. Damages and Passing-Onin Analogous Areas
The practical importance of the general damage rule as a challenge to
the rule which requires proof of actual loss is questionable in view of its
subsequent history.95 Only one court in recent years has even suggested
that it might apply the general damage rule in the Robinson-Patman
9
area,98 while a number of courts have expressly disavowed it. 7
91 See Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150

(2d 9Cir.
1949).
2

State Wholesale Grocer's v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 154 F. Supp. 471
(N.D. Ill. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 258 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 947 (1959).
93 But see the proposed statutory measure of damages, text accompanying note

67 supra.
94

Yet it would seem that the court which decided Gus Blass would so hold. See
note 78 suipra.
95 Some commentators believe that the Russellville opinion has disavowed the
general damage rule announced in Gus Blass. See Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas
Co., 240 F.2d 457, 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957); Rowe, The
Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act: a Twenty-Year Perspective, 57 COLUm. L.
REv.961059, 1078-80 (1957).
Becker-Lehmann, Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 202 F. Supp 514 (E.D.
Mo. 1959) (on defendant's motion for summary judgment).
97 Kidd v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 295 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1961); Freedman v.
Philadelphia Terminals Auction Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1961 Trade Cas.) ir 70010
(E.D. Pa. May 3, 1961) ; Youngson v. Tidewater Oil Co., 166 F. Supp. 146 (D. Ore.
1958); Alexander v. Texas Co., 149 F. Supp. 37, 41 (W.D. La. 1957).
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Nevertheless, the question of general damages is not restricted to
Robinson-Patman violations and its application in an analogous area has
been recently approved. In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp.,98 the court held that a shoe manufacturer who was required to pay
excessive rental and royalty charges for a leased machine could recover the
excess charges. The court discounted the possibility of passing-on, stating
that the manufacturer was not a middleman. It has been correctly pointed
out that this argument is specious, since the increase might have easily
been reflected in the price of plaintiff's finished product.9 9 Nevertheless,
this language of the court was seized upon by another court in the same
circuit to distinguish a discriminatory pricing situation. 100 There is strong
language in the Hanover Shoe decision, however, to the effect that the
court would have disregarded the possibility of passing-on, whether or not
plaintiff was a middleman.' 0 '
The HanoverShoe court's disregard of passing-on is clearly in conflict
with the weight of authority even in Sherman Act cases. Perhaps the
most influential of these are the "oil jobber" cases, which resulted from a
public suit 102 in which defendants were found guilty of fixing prices of
gasoline in a large area of the Midwest. When a number of jobbers who
had allegedly been forced to pay higher prices brought private damage
suits, 03 the court held for the supplier on the ground that the illegal
scheme had also fixed resale prices, thus assuring that any damages would
fall not on the jobbers but on the ultimate consumer. Earlier, the Supreme
Court, in Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., ° 4 had indicated in dictum that
a shipper could not collect as damages the higher rates he had to pay due
to a conspiracy in restraint of trade since the excess might have been
passed on to the ultimate consumer.
On the other hand, there are cases which have awarded the plaintiff
the price discrimination or increase as damages. For example, in Thomsen
v. Cayser,10 5 defendants had established a uniform freight rate for carriage by sea and refunded part of it to those who shipped exclusively with
the conspirators. The court held that "the plaintiffs alleged a charge over
a reasonable rate and the amount of it. If the charge be true that more
98185 F. Supp. 826 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert.

denied, 364 U.S. 901 (1960).
469, 476 (1961).
09 Comment, 70 YALE L.E.
100 Freedman v. Philadelphia Terminals Auction Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1961

Trade
Cas.) 70010, at 78005 (E.D. Pa. May 3, 1961).
101
See text accompanying note 66 supra.
102 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
103 Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138
F.2d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Twin Ports Oil
Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941) ;
Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 42 F. Supp. 369, 371 (W.D. Wis.), appeal
dismissed, 130 F2d 535 (7th Cir. 1942).
104 260 U.S. 156, 165 (1922).
105 243 U.S. 66 (1917).
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than a reasonable rate was secured by the combination, the excess over
what was reasonable was an element of injury." 108 And, there are other
cases in which, although plaintiff's absorption was not certain, the discriminatory differential was given as damages without discussing the
07
possibility of passing-on.'
The "oil jobber" cases and Keogh did, of course, specifically advert to
the passing-on issue and, on their face, would oppose the adoption in the
Robinson-Patman area of the general damage rule-which disregards
passing-on and which does not ask whether plaintiff was an ultimate consumer or a middleman. Yet there is such an obvious distinction between
cases in which prices are increased to all competitors and those in which
discriminations in price between competitors occur, that the former's
recognition and the latter's disregard of the possibility of passing-on may
not be wholly incompatible. In cases of the former class all competitors
are equally victimized and, theoretically, any "loss" is recouped because
all are able to charge the increase to their customers. This may occur any
time all competitors in a relatively large market area are charged increased
prices; however, it is most obvious in an "oil jobber" situation, where
passing-on is assured through resale price maintenance. Moreover, in these
cases, it is unlikely that even special damages could be proved; if the
ultimate consumer has no choice but to pay the increased price offered by
all competitors, there is no reason for him to take his business away from
his original supplier. On the other hand, in cases such as Thomsen v.
Cayser, the discrimination in price between competitors necessarily injures
the one discriminated against, so that, at least, the fact of some injury is
08
clear.'
Prior to the oil-jobber cases, the possibility of passing-on increased or
discriminatory prices was recognized in a series of cases growing out of the
provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act-an act which is similar, in
some of its provisions, to the Robinson-Patman Act. Section 2 prohibits
discrimination in rates, 10 9 while section 1 forbids the charging of excessive
rates." 0 Section 8 of the act is analogous to section 4 of the Clayton Act
in that it provides that any common carrier who does anything forbidden
106 Id. at 88.

107 Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906) ;

Peto v. Howell, 101 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1938) ; United States Tobacco Co. v. Ameri-

can Tobacco Co., 163 Fed. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1908). In Straus v. Victor Talldng Mach.
Co., 297 Fed. 791 (2d Cir. 1924), there was evidence that plaintiff engaged in a
price war with his competitors, so that he may have absorbed the increased price
to him. Id. at 802. However, the court indicated that the theory of the suit was
based on recoupment of plaintiff's increased costs, rather than on his actual losses.
Id. at
802-03.
10 8
EDWARDs, THE PRIcE DIscmmiNATIoN LAW 532 (1959) explains that this
is so because, "if he reduces prices to meet competition, his profits are diminished.
If he does not reduce prices when his favored competitor does so, his sales are
diminished; and if he encounters no enhancement of price competition, he suffers the
effects of the favored buyer's intensified sales -effort and accelerated expansion."
109 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
11024 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(5) (1958).
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by the act "shall be liable to the person or persons injured thereby for the
full amount of damages sustained in consequence of any such violation
...
P3111 While the loss to the shipper is not affected by whether the
rate was unlawful or merely discriminatory, the courts have made an
essentially artificial distinction between the two types of injury. Thus,
in Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-TaenzerLumber Co., 11 2 it was questioned
whether the plaintiff in a reparation suit for damages caused by a rate
overcharge was injured since his customers actually paid the overcharge.
The Supreme Court found no difficulty in answering:
The general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is
not to go beyond the first step. As it does not attribute remote
consequences to a defendant so it holds him liable if proximately
the plaintiff has suffered loss. The'plaintiff suffered losses to the
amount of the verdict when. they paid. Their claim accrued at
once in the theory of the law and it does not inquire into later
113

events.

The argument that the one who was actually injured would be thus denied
recovery was found unpersuasive by a later decision:
The plaintiffs have suffered injury within the meaning of § 8 of
the Interstate Commerce Act; and the purpose of that section
would be defeated if the tortfeasors were permitted to escape
reparation by a plea that the ultimate incidence of the injury was
not upon those who were compelled in the first instance to pay
the unlawful charge." 4
The court in HanoverShoe relied on this line of cases as supporting its
theory that damages resulted at the instant the overcharge was paid. But
in Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co.,115 the Supreme Court had distinguished
between a rate reparation proceeding and a proceeding to collect damages
for discrimination in shipping charges. For example, in Pennsylvania
R.R. v. International Coal Mining Co.,116 plaintiff attempted to collect the
difference between shipping rates paid by it and lower rates allowed other
shippers. The Court pointed out that the gist of the case was that the
plaintiff had paid a discriminatory rate rather than one in excess of that
which was lawful. The Court held that in such a case the measure of damages was not the amount of the discrimination, but "the pecuniary loss
inflicted on the plaintiff as a result of the rebate paid. Those damages
might be the same as the rebate, or less than the rebate, or many times
1124 Stat 382 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 8 (1958).
112 245 U.S. 531 (1918).
113 Id. at 533-34.
114 Adams v. Mills, 286 U.S. 397, 408 (1932).
115245 U.S. 531, 534 (1918).
116230 U.S. 184 (1913)..
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greater than rebate; but unless they were proved they could not be recovered." 117 This distinction was said to be founded upon a similar distinction made in English law where an overcharge is deemed to be an
extortion to be recovered in full, while discriminatory, but lawful, rates
may be recovered only to the extent that they result in actual damages."n
However, damages for both types of injury are recoverable under section 8
of the Interstate Commerce Act, which does not require such a distinction. 19 It is apparent that the distinction is based, not on any rigid
definition of damages, but on considerations of policy. One of these considerations is that while only the one who paid an overcharge may recover
it in a reparation proceeding, 20 all those who are injured by discriminatory
rates may sue for these damages.' 2 ' If all parties to whom the discrimination was passed on were permitted to recover the amount of the discriminatory rate, this would subject defendant to multiple recoveries.
Therefore, in the latter situation, the plaintiffs are limited to actual damages.'2 Moreover, the distinction is defended by an argument that the
basic policy of the Interstate Commerce Act is to preserve equality of rates,
and that this equality is maintained when a reparation order is established
since the moneys returned place the plaintiff on a par with other shippers
who have been charged the lawful rate. On the other hand, where one
shipper receives a discriminatory rebate which results in a rate less than
that which is reasonable, to have the defendant return that discriminatory
charge would in effect cause plaintiff to receive a rate which is less than
the established rate. 23
C. A Justificationfor the GeneralDamage Rule in Robinson-PatmanCases
The Interstate Commerce cases illustrate the proposition that, where
justified, the definition of damages can be given meaning in terms of
17 Id. at 203.
I's Id. at 201-02.
Compare Pennsyl119 24 Stat. 382 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 8 (1958).
vania PR. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184 (1913), a § 8 rate discrimination case, with Adams v. Mills, 286 U.S. 397 (1932), a reparation case in
which defendant argued that under § 8 plaintiff could only recover actual damages.
The Adams Court stated: "In contemplation of law the claim for damages arose at
the time the extra charge was paid." Id. at 407.
120 Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 534 (1918).
121 Ibd.
122 Of course, if only the original shipper were permitted to recover in discrimination cases, or if a single joint recovery by all those injured through passing on
were required, the same rule could be applied in discrimination and in overcharge
cases. Note that the possibility of multiple recoveries under the Robinson-Patman
Act is rendered unlikely by the courts' interpretation of that act's language. See
text accompanying notes 28-41 supra.
2 See Pennsylvania RR. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 206
(1913) ; cf. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 445-46 (1907).
This point is discussed in Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d
988, 995 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945). The Gus Blass cout argued
that such a rationale had no application in a Robinson-Patman proceeding since the
purpose of the act is not to establish overall equality, but equality as between the
recipient of the discriminatory rebate and his competitors. Id. at 996.
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legislative aims. Clearly, one who pays more than the legal rate established
by the Interstate Commerce Commission may pass on that increase to his
customers and escape all injury; yet, in order to maintain lawful rates, it
is held that only that person may recover the increase124
Similarly, policy arguments can be made for disregarding the possibility of passing-on in Robinson-Patman cases. The strongest is that the
discriminatory pricing situation can be distinguished from the situation in
which an increased price is charged to all competitors. In the latter situation, passing-on will almost certainly shift the burden of the increase to
plaintiff's customers since those customers cannot turn to plaintiff's competitors for a better price. In the former situation, passing on the discriminatory price will almost certainly hurt the disfavored competitor; his customers will turn to the one who has gotten the advantage of the lower price.
Admittedly, the loss through diversion cannot be exactly equated with the
discriminatory differential if there is actual passing-on. However, it is
questionable whether, as a practical matter, one discriminated against can
actually pass on the increased price to his customers.12 5 But, even if some
passing-on should occur, it is evident that the victim of the discrimination
has been injured; only the extent of that injury is uncertain12 6 This
would seem to be the ideal situation in which to apply a rule which eases
plaintiff's burden of proof. 2 7 The paucity of cases awarding damages
under the Robinson-Patman Act, despite the Bigelow rule, suggests that
the general damage rule, rather than the "wrongdoer" rule, is the proper
vehicle for liberalization in this area. Furthermore, it must be remembered
that one of the situations which Congress sought to redress when it passed
the Robinson-Patman Act was the lessening of competition between two
individual competitors.2 8 It is hardly feasible to require the Federal
Trade Commission, as a practical matter, to enforce those sanctions in
every case in which only a small businessman has been injured. The
economics of the administrative process cannot support such widespread
enforcement of the law, even if the Commission were favorably disposed
towards this interpretation of the act, which is questionable.12 9 Therefore,
the only effective means of protecting the small business is to permit it a
measure of self-help through private enforcement made as simple as possible, consistent with fair play for the defendant. In such a situation, the
issue cannot be restricted to whether plaintiff must establish absorption or
be required to fall back upon traditional proof of damage requirements.
E.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531 (1918).
125 See Barber, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-

124

Patinan Experience, 30 GEO. WAsH. L. Rxv. 181, 219 (1961).
126 See note 108 supra.
127 See Barber, supra note 125, at 210; Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requireinents and Proof of Damages in Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws,

30 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 231, 236 (1961).
2 8 See authorities cited note 16 supra.
129
See Purex Corp., 51 F.T.C. 100, 112, 165-68 (1954).
Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).

But cf. FTC v. Morton
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One must also determine whether a defendant should be permitted to
escape the consequences of an act which has necessarily injured the plaintiff only because the exact extent of such injury cannot be established. Admittedly, other parties may have been injured. However, since the act
closely restricts the parties who may invoke its sanctions, 30 to keep the
initial purchaser from suing because he may not have received the full
brunt of the discrimination is to forbid, in most cases, any redress at all.
(It may be noted, in this connection, that the limitation on standing negates the threat of multiple recoveries.) Finally, in answering these questions, it must be remembered that the general damage rule applied to a
discrimination case does not award damages where none exist. Rather, it
is one way of estimating the extent of such injury: a technique consistent
with the liberal spirit of the Bigelow decision.
D. Application of the General Damage Rule
There are few decisions applying the general damage rule in RobinsonPatman cases; hence it is impossible to give definitive answers to many
of the problems which may arise should its use become more common.
Nevertheless, it is possible to examine several of these problem areas and
to suggest at least some basic guide lines.
1. Cost Justification and Service Discrimination
All price discriminations, even if they affect competition at one of the
three competitive levels, are not necessarily unlawful. To the extent that
they are justified by savings in cost of manufacture, sale or delivery due
to methods or quantities of purchase, such discriminations are not unlawful.'13 However, once a non-cost-justified discrimination is proved, the
size of the discrimination has no significance in a public suit so long as the
requisite effect on competition is established. Therefore, the fact that a
discrimination is partially cost justified is of no moment in such a suit. On
the other hand, the exact extent of injury is of paramount concern in a
private damage suit. To the extent that discriminations are cost justified
they can have caused no actionable injury to the private plaintiff. Since
the special damage rule is not based on the size of the discrimination but
on the consequential effects of such discrimination, the fact that the actual
non-cost-justified differential is two cents rather than four cents, as plaintiff may have initially charged in his complaint, would be sufficient to destroy the plaintiff's case, since it would then be necessary for the plaintiff
to prove what part of the diversion of trade and consequential loss of
1

- 0See notes 28-41 supra and accompanying text.
131 Robinson-Patman Act §2(a), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a) (1958) ; Reid v. Harper & Bros., 235 F.2d 420, 421-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 952 (1956). Cost justification is not a defense to a § 2(d) or §2(e) charge.
FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 58-59 (1959). However, the fact that
the services were made available to competitors on proportionally equal terms might

serve the same justificatory purpose under these sections. Id. at 61 n.4 (dictum).
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profits resulted from the non-cost-justified portion of the discrimination.
Only where the plaintiff had absorbed the entire discrimination-in a sense
liquidating his damages by meeting his competitor's price-could he preserve his case by the simple expedient of reducing his claim for damages
in proportion to the degree of cost justification. By contrast, since the
general damage rule specifically uses the discrimination as the basis for
computation of damages, this result would follow in all general damage
133
cases. 32 However, in view of the difficulty of proving cost justification,
it would seem that it would offer little solace to defendants under either
13 4
method of computation of damages.
The court in Gus Blass applied the general damage rule because it
found that plaintiff's payment of more money than his competitor occasioned a direct business loss to him. It indicated that it would not apply
this rule to the typical discriminatory service situation, basing its refusal on
the fact that there any loss would be consequential. This distinction disregards the reality of the situation. Only where plaintiff has absorbed a
price discrimination has he truly received a direct business damage. If
the price differential is passed on, his damages are as consequential as if
he were discriminated against by not being given a service provided to his
competitor. If the general damage rule is justified by policy, it is justified
as much in service discrimination as in price discrimination cases-and in
price discrimination cases wherein the damages are "passed on," and hence
consequential, as in similar cases wherein they are absorbed, and hence
direct. In none of these situations is the general damage rule an absolutely
exact measure of damages; in all of them it is a reasonably accurate-and,
more important, a reasonably provable--approximation of the actual damages. To limit its application in an arbitrary manner is to discriminate
unjustly among plaintiffs who have suffered like injury.
2. Mitigation of Damages
If the general damage rule is accepted as a substitute for the special
damage rule, the question remains whether its use should be required
in every situation involving Robinson-Patman discriminations. A tentative answer was given in a case which refused to apply the general damage
'

32

See American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F2d 38, 56 (8th Cir.

1951).
M See ATI'y GEN. NAT'L CoMm. ANTITRUST REP. 171-74 (1955).
134 The same result should follow concerning the meeting-competition defense of

the Robinson-Patman Act § 2(b), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958).
This defense is only applicable where defendant, in good faith, meets the lower price
of a competitor. He may not undercut such price. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC,
340 U.S. 231, 241-42 (1951). Thus, where defendant sells commodities at a ten
cent price differential between purchasers, and eight cents of the differential is justified by the meeting-competition defense, only the two cent undercut should be considered
in computing damages if the general damage rule is used.

This question has not

been discussed in any of the damage cases. The third defense provided by § 2(a),
"price changes . . . in response to changing conditions affecting the market for or
the marketability of the goods concerned . . . . ," is virtually unused and has received
no fixed interpretation.

Therefore no discussion of its possible application in this

context is attempted. See ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 177-79 (1955).
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rule, but which inferred that plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages would
necessarily limit his recovery to the discriminatory difference. The plaintiff in a private antitrust action must, as in any other damage suit, establish that he has not incurred any unnecessary damage.' 3 5 The court in
Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. reasoned that this doctrine should limit recovery under the special damage rule, stating that if plaintiff were injured
by the discrimination, it would be his duty to hire a demonstrator in order
to limit his damages. 136 Extending this reasoning to the situation in which
the discrimination resulted in an out-of-pocket loss, it could be argued that
it would be plaintiff's duty to absorb the loss instead of passing it on to his
customers, where the passing-on might result in greater damages by diversion of trade. 13 7 While this action on the part of the victim of discrimination serves to fix the measure of damages-at precisely the level which the
general damage rule would fix them-to require every plaintiff to act in
this fashion would lead to harsh results. It would force plaintiff to predict
his damages; if he failed to absorb and suffered greater damage by diversion of trade, his damages would nevertheless be limited to the amount of
this discrimination. In addition, while it may be logical to assume that
absorption places competitors on equal footing except for the discriminatory
price, it is possible that in some situations plaintiff may be operating on
such a narrow profit margin that absorption of the differential will drive
him out of business; more commonly, he would find himself lacking in
funds for advertising or for prompt payment of bills-situations which
might result in great but highly speculative injury. It could hardly be
argued that in these situations his damages must be limited to the dis138
criminatory difference in price, even under the general damage hule.
3. Mechanics of Application
Normally, the general damage rule should approximate actual damages by multiplying the amount of the illegal price differential by the number of units purchased by the victim of the discrimination. But there is an
obvious outside limitation to this technique: when the plaintiff has purchased a far larger number of units than the beneficiary or beneficiaries of
135 American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 55 (8th Cir.
1951); 6 TOULmix, ANTI-TRusT LAws §27.16 (1951); Note, 61 YALE L.J. 1010,

1022 3(1952).
6

1 Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F2d 150,
153 (2d Cir. 1949).
137 On the other hand, the middleman with, for example, particularly loyal customers would minimize his damages not by absorbing but by passing-on.
138A position contrary to that of Sun Cosmetic Shoppe was apparently taken in
Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985, 992-93 (S.D. Fla. 1949),
aff'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. disnissed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951), in
which the court, in addition to awarding general damages measured by the amount
of the discrimination, seemed to take into account the effect on plaintiff's good will and
progress in the citrus industry caused by the discrimination. See also American Can
Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 60 (8th Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion).
The Senate's proposed measure of damages recognized this possibility by giving
plaintiff the choice of proving general or special damages. Text accompanying note

67 supra. Needless to say, this is somewhat less harsh on defendants than the augmented general damage rule of Bruce's Juices.
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the discrimination, it can hardly be said that he has suffered the damages
which would be awarded him under the normal application of the general
damage rule.139 If he has not met his competitors' price reduction, or if
his competitor has not reduced prices but has instead used the price advantage, for example, to purchase advertising, the volume advantage remaining with the victim of the discrimination suggests that he has not, in
fact, suffered the expected damages. If, instead, the victim has met his
competitor's price reduction, it may be questioned whether this action was
necessary, in view of his great volume advantage. Hence it seems proper
to limit the recovery under the general damage rule to the product of the
discriminatory differential and the number of units bought by either the
victim or the beneficiary of the discrimination, whichever is smaller. Normally, the advantage of discriminatory prices is allowed only to the largest
purchasers; in the rare case where this is not so, the plaintiff should be
held to a choice between the amended general damage rule and the proof
of special damages.
Similar problems arise when there are an unascertained number of
competitors of the beneficiary of the price discrimination. Once again, it
is possible that the general damage rule will award damages far out of
proportion to the actual injury to competitors. However, in practice it is
likely that in this situation the beneficiary of the advantage will have purchased as many or more units than his combined competitors. Hence, it
seems proper to put the burden of proving that the general damage rule
will result in overgenerous recoveries on the defendant in these circumstances.140 Moreover, where the damaged competitors are small by comparison to the beneficiary of the discrimination, the mere fact that their
purchases exceed by a small amount the total purchases of the beneficiary
should not necessarily limit the application of the general damage rule,
since, in this case, the beneficiary's leverage may be sufficient to more than
overbalance its competitors' combined volume advantage.
4. The General Damage Rule in Primary-Line Cases
No case has yet applied the general damage rule to primary-line
cases. 141 However, the rule would seem to be applicable in these cases
139 See Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345, 357 (E.D.
N.Y. 1960), in which the court did not reach the damage issue but felt compelled to
discuss the problem posed by use of the rule:
Sano argues that the measure of damages in this kind of case is the difference in price to it and another buyer, multiplied by the number of gallons
bought by Sano during the period that the particular difference prevailed.
To show an application is to refute the theory. From April . . . to December . . . Uneeda bought 239,440 gallons . . . . During this same
period Sano bought 5,200,379 gallons. Thus, on a transaction that conferred
a $1,297.20 benefit on Uneeda, Sano finds an untrebled injury of $26,001.90.
There is nothing in law or logic . . . that supports such a ridiculous result.
140 The use of interpleader might provide a possible solution, permitting defendant
to collect all possible plaintiffs and determine each plaintiff's share of damages in one
suit. See Comment, 70 YATr L.J. 469, 479 n.66 (1961).
141 One commentator, Barber, supra note 125, at 216, states that in the primaryline case of American Co-op. Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907 (7th
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also. The gist of primary discrimination is local price-cutting supported
by discriminatory pricing between customers of the defendant in the local
area and those in other areas. The discriminatory differential between
customers of the defendant cannot be used as the basis for computing damages, since the measure of the offense is the difference in price between
defendant's and his competitor's product. On the other hand, the outside
limit of the unit damage is the differential between the defendant's local and
nonlocal prices, since any further difference between plaintiff's price and
defendant's local price is not the result of defendant's discrimination.
Within these limits, it is clear that if defendant's price cut had been met
by an equivalent cut on plaintiff's part, plaintiff would be entitled to recover the profits lost through his price cut since he would have fixed his
damages by absorption. However, if the plaintiff did not meet the price
cut, he would certainly lose customers to his price-cutting competitor-just
as would the plaintiff who has been victimized at the secondary level. In
either situation, the rationale of the general damage rule would permit
recovery of the differential.
E. Conclusion
The general damage rule cannot solve every problem of establishing
damage in a discriminatory pricing situation. It is admittedly a rougher
estimate of damages than the special damage rule. However, it is highly
questionable whether a measure of damages which-most certainly in the
Robinson-Patman area-has so limited successful private prosecution
should be perpetuated. The Interstate Commerce cases and the Bigelow
rule are recognitions that the concept of "damages" is flexible and can be
modified with an eye to necessity. The rigid insistence on the possibility of
passing-on in discriminatory pricing situations and the refusal to permit
recovery unless plaintiff has proved absorption disregard both the unlikelihood of passing-on in these situations and the near certainty of customer
diversion to the advantaged competitor in the rare case in which passing-on
is attempted. Further, the courts have created an impossible situation by
announcing that the plaintiff on the secondary level may not recover if
he has passed on and then denying recovery to those on the tertiary level
who are the only others possibly injured. The general damage rule offers
the victims of discrimination some hope of recovery in private suits. The
alternative is to continue to permit violators to escape the consequences
of acts which have injured the victims of their discrimination.
L.F.P.
Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 721 (1946), a formula technique was adopted. There,
Anchor met its competitor's price cut. The court awarded Anchor the amount of
its price cut multiplied by the number of units it sold. Id. at 914. While it is true
that a "formula" was used, this case would seem to be merely an example of a particular application of the special damage rule. The plaintiff fixed his damages by
meeting his competitor's price. See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra. See also
text accompanying note 138 supra.

